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WHEN PRIVATE PROPERTY BECOMES A
PUBLIC FORUM
Becky Pintar*
Las Vegas is a neon encrusted city in the middle of the Nevada desert,
known primarily for its extensive legalized gambling. It is a city teeming with
tourists, distinguished by a twenty-four hour lifestyle, and marked by unprece-
dented development.' As Las Vegas faces the myriad of problems exacerbated
by these factors, there is a united effort among both private casino resort own-
ers and municipal governments to find ways to limit certain First Amendment
and commercial activities along the resort corridor, 2 which encompasses the
infamous Las Vegas Boulevard ("the Strip"). Casino owners and government
officials are concerned that certain "controversial" activities taking place on the
Strip will have an adverse impact on the lucrative tourist business, the lifeblood
of Las Vegas. The activities causing concern include "off premises canvassing"
that target tourists with sexually explicit fliers for adult-oriented businesses,
3
and union activities targeting non-union casinos, 4 which may have a discourag-
ing effect on the tourist trade for those properties.
One recent case, Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive
Board of Las Vegas,5 examined the attempt of the Venetian Casino to prohibit
First Amendment activity on a public sidewalk built on private property! The
Venetian Casino sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to enjoin a la-
bor union from holding a labor protest on the its sidewalk.7 A TRO may be
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granted to enjoin an opposing party from causing "immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage."8 The federal district court held that a pedestrian
walkway located directly adjacent to the large casino resort, although built on
private property, is a public forum for First Amendment purposes. 9 The court
found the Venetian Casino did not have the right to exclude individuals from
the sidewalk, including union protesters, and there was no "taking"'10 by the
county of the Venetian's private property rights in failing to cite or arrest the
protesters. 1
The Venetian Casino case, which the Venetian is appealing to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 12 could have substantial impact on other current or
future attempts to limit or ban handbilling, solicitation or picketing along the
strip corridor.13 The court found that the sidewalk located on private property
is a public forum, thereby opening its use to individuals seeking to express their
First Amendment rights of free speech.14 The reasoning employed by the court
was sound in light of the various factors in this case, including the history of
the sidewalk in question, the current public use of it, and the activities that the
court was asked to enjoin. The Venetian Casino agreed to build the sidewalk,
the only thoroughfare for pedestrians, and to allow access to all individuals."5
The holding of the court that the Venetian sidewalk is a public forum is clearly
supported by ample Supreme Court decisions on First Amendment rights on
property.
Part I summarizes the facts of the Venetian Casino case. Part II examines
relevant case law, with an emphasis on the doctrine of the public forum, appli-
cation of the doctrine, and limitations of the public forum involving private
property. Part III analyzes the parties' arguments in the Venetian Casino case,
and examines the court's ruling and rationale. Part IV analyzes the ruling in
the Venetian Casino case, and compares its outcome with other relevant cases.
This note concludes that the court's ruling that the sidewalk in question is a
public forum is justified, because the sidewalk fronting the Venetian Casino's
property provides the only means of public access for individuals to move from
one point on the Strip to another.
I. FACTS OF THE VENETIAN CASINO CASE
On March 1, 1999, the Culinary Workers Union and the Bartenders Un-
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1).
9 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1036.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
11 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1036.
12 Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive
Board, 45 F. Supp. 1027 (D. Nev. 1999) (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
13 David Mirhadi, Paper Pushers, L.V. REV. J., May 30, 2000, at El.
14 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1036.
15 Id. at 1029.
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ion ("Unions ' ) held a rally protesting employment practices of the non-union
Venetian Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip.' 6 The rally, for which the Un-
ions had obtained a permit from the county, took place on the sidewalks that
fronted the Venetian property. 17 The Venetian summoned the police to arrest
the picketers as trespassers, claiming that because the sidewalks were located
on private property, it had a right to control the activity which was permitted on
them.18 On the advice of the county district attorney's office, the police de-
clined to arrest or detain any picketer.' 9 Three days later, the Venetian filed a
motion with the United States District Court, District of Nevada, seeking a
temporary restraining order, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
20
barring any future protests on sidewalks located in front of the Venetian Re-
sort. 21 After a fact-finding hearing, the federal district court issued an order
denying the TRO and declaring that "since the sidewalk performs an essential
public function, the Venetian does not have the right to exclude individuals
from the sidewalk based upon permissible exercises of their right to expression
under the First Amendment ... ,22
The Venetian Casino Resort is a large casiib and hotel on the Las Vegas
Strip.23 In 1997, as part of the development of the property, the Venetian en-
tered into an agreement with Clark County to convey "all proposed public
property rights ... to the COUNTY or the State of Nevada Department of
Transportation, at no cost or expense, free and clear of all liens, covenants, re-
strictions and encumbrances.., for public use of sidewalks, walkways or other
forms of pedestrian passage ... without restrictions. 24
As part of the agreement with Clark County, the Venetian Casino agreed to
abide by the findings of a required state traffic study to determine the impact
the new resort would have on existing traffic. 25 The traffic impact study com-
pleted by the State of Nevada Department of Transportation (NDOT) deter-
mined that Las Vegas Boulevard needed widening by incorporating the existing
sidewalk into an additional lane. That sidewalk was the government's current
right-of-way, and the widened street left no public sidewalk. The Venetian Ca-
sino and NDOT entered into an agreement in 1999.26 In this agreement, the
Venetian Casino agreed to accommodate the increased traffic flow by demol-
161id.
71d. at 1031.
18 Id.
191Id.
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1) ("A temporary restraining order may be granted ...if (1) it
clearly appears from specific facts shown ... that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant. . .21Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1031.
22 Id. at 1036.
23 Id at 1029.
24 Id. at 1029-30.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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ishing the existing sidewalk for street expansion and to construct a new side-
walk on its private property for pedestrian access.27 In this agreement, the Ve-
netian Casino retained "full rights inherent to the ownership of private property
to the full extent permitted by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] to the
United States Constitution." 28 The Venetian Casino then demolished the pub-
lic sidewalk and erected a temporary pedestrian walkway on its private prop-
erty.
2 9
In February 1999, the Unions applied for and received a permit from Clark
County to hold a rally protesting the non-union practices of the Venetian Ca-
sino.30 The Venetian Casino, upon learning about the impending union rally,
erected signs stating the sidewalk was private property.
31
About 1,300 protesters attended the rally held on March 1, 1999.32 Al-
though the Venetian Casino summoned the Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD), the police declined to arrest or cite any participants on the advice of
the district attorney's office. 33 The Venetian Casino filed an action against the
Unions, the District Attorney, and LVMPD, seeking a declaratory judgment
under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.34 It alleged the Defendant's actions "constitute an im-
permissible deprivation of private property rights without due process and that
the privately owned and maintained pedestrian walkway is not a public forum
for First Amendment activity." 35 The Venetian Casino also sought injunctive
relief, enjoining the County Defendants from awarding permits or otherwise
allowing any persons or organizations to conduct expressive activities on Ve-
netian's private property, including its sidewalks. 36 Although the Unions main-
tained they could exercise their First Amendment rights on the pedestrian
walkway, the Venetian Casino claimed that the sidewalk was not a public fo-
rum for First Amendment free speech rights.37 The American Civil Liberties
Union of Nevada(ACLUN) sought and was granted the right to intervene 38 on
behalf of the Union, arguing that because of the First Amendment rights in-
27 Id.
28 id.
29 id at 1031.30 d at n.2 ( "Nev. Rev. Stat. § 16.06 requires persons to obtain permits before putting on a
special event requiring the closing of a public street or right-of-way.").
31 id.
32 id.
33 id.
14 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1994) (Creation of remedy. "In a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction.. . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
tion...")
35 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1031.
36 id.
37 Id.
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2) (Intervention. "(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely appli-
cation, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common.").
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volved, the case "bears not only on the named Defendants, but also on the
rights of the ACLUN and of the general public."
39
The Venetian Casino filed its complaint on March 4, 1999, contending that
the Venetian owns the sidewalk in question as private property and that it never
opened the sidewalk for use as a public forum for First Amendment purposes.
40
On April 27, 1999, Judge Phillip Pro issued an order denying the Venetian's
motions. Judge Pro held that, although the pedestrian walkway was built on
private property, it is a "thoroughfare along a main public road and ... it falls
within a very limited exception to the general rule that private property is not
subject to the First Amendment."4 1 He ruled the public had the right to use the
walkway for expressive activities protected under the First Amendment.42
The Unions planned other demonstrations on the sidewalks in dispute sub-
sequent to March 1, 1999. 43 In each case, the LVMPD upon the advice of the
district attorney's office, refused to enforce Venetian's alleged "private prop-
erty right to exclude disruptive expressive activity and other disruptive activity
from its private walkway unless and until Venetian obtains a federal court order
establishing that the walkway is Venetian's private property and that the Un-
ions and others have no constitutional right to engage in expressive activities
there." 44
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT CASE LAW
The public forum is a judicially created doctrine that protects the right
of the public to engage in First Amendment-protected speech and other expres-
sive activity in public places.45 This section will explore relevant case law that
established and defined the doctrine. Part A will look at cases creating the doc-
trine. Part B will examine cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the
doctrine. Part C will examine the attempt of governmental entities to limit ex-
pressive activity through the passage of regulations or ordinances.
39Opposition to Plaintiff's motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction at 1, Venetian (No.
CV-S-99-00276-PMP).40 Complaint, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP) (the Venetian claimed it was entitled to a
declaratory order stating the actions of the defendants constituted a deprivation of private
property rights without due process of law; and 2) an order declaring its privately owned pe-
destrian walkway does not constitute a public forum). See also Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at
1029 (Defendant County filed a Response on April 12, 1999 ; Defendant Unions filed an
Opposition on April 12, 1999; ACLUN sought and was granted the right to intervene on the
behalf of the Defendants and also filed an Opposition on April 12, 1999; reply was filed by
the Venetian on April 19, 1999 and a fact-finding hearing was held on April 21, 1999).41 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1036.
42 id.
43 Plaintiffs Expedited Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Certification of
Controlling Question of Law at 9, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
44 Id.
45 Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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A. Public Forum Doctrine
The Supreme Court first addressed the public forum doctrine relating to• • 46
streets and sidewalks in Hague v. Committee for Indusustrial Organization.
The Court found that "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions."4 7
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,
48
the Supreme Court further delineated three categories of public property under
the public forum doctrine. The first category is those places "which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.",
49
The Court found the state has a very limited right to regulate expressive activity
in areas that fall under this category including streets, sidewalks and parks.
50
The next category "consists of public property which the state has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."5' The Court calls this a
"limited public forum." Although the state is "not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility," as long as it is retained, the state must have a
compelling government interest to restrict or regulate activities.5 2 Areas that
fall under this category include schools and post offices.
53
The final category is property reserved by the state for a specific purpose in
which activity may be regulated as long as it "is reasonable and not an effort to
suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's
view."5 4 The Court has included public airports, military bases, jails and gov-
ernment buildings under this category.55
B. Application of the Public Forum Doctrine
A decisive case involving the application of the public forum doctrine to
private property is Marsh v. Alabama.56 In Marsh, the Supreme Court found
that a company town, located totally on private property, could not limit First
461d. at 515.
47 Id.
" 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
49 Id. at 45.
50Id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 46-47.
53 See, e.g, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); U.S. Postal Service v. Coun-
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
14 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
55 See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jails); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising space in city rapid transit cars); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (publicly owned airport).
6 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Amendment protected activities because the town assumed the characteristics
of a public forum. 57 The Court balanced the private property rights with those
rights protected by the First Amendment and found "the latter occupy a pre-
ferred position. ' ' 8 The Supreme Court subsequently limited Marsh in Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks59 and Lloyd Corporation, LTD., v. Tanner.6° In Flagg
Bros., the Court formulated a narrow interpretation of Marsh, as seen by its an-
swer to the following question, "Under what circumstances can private prop-
erty be treated as though it were public? The answer that Marsh gives is when
property has taken on all the attributes of a town.. ." 61 In Lloyd, a private
shopping center was allowed to ban the distribution of handbills within the
building complex after a sharply divided Court found that the property does not
"lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use
it for designated purposes." 62 In Lloyd, the shopping center had a strictly-
enforced policy prohibiting the distribution of any material on any area in the
63interior of the shopping center.
Lloyd is a major case ruling on the issue of First Amendment rights of in-
dividuals in shopping centers. Other leading cases include Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza6 4 and Hudgens v. National Labor Re-
65lations Board. In Logan Valley, the Court found that union picketers could
not be banned from a private shopping center if they are using the property in a
manner and purpose "generally consonant with the use... [to which] the prop-
erty is actually put."66 The Court posed the question, to be decided in later
cases, whether private property rights could be balanced against First Amend-
ment rights.
67
Another major shopping center case is Hudgens,68 in which the Court for-
mally overruled Logan Valley. The Court found that shopping centers are not
functionally equivalent to the Marsh company town and ruled that a store
within a mall could ban picketers.
69
In International Society For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Reber,70 a dis-
trict court in California upheld the right of Knott's Berry Farm to prohibit the
distribution of religious literature and solicitation of donations on a section of
51 Id. at 509.
58 1d.
59 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
60407 U.S. 551 (1972).
61 Flagg, 436 U.S. at 159 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 502 (dissenting opinion)).
62 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569.
631 d. at 551.
64 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
65 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
66Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319-20.
61 Id. at 320.
68 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
69 Id. at 521.
70 454 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D.Cal. 1978).
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the main thoroughfare into Knott's Berry Farm.7 1 The question presented in
that case was to what extent should "speech be protected under the First
Amendment when it takes place on property that appears to be public but is ac-
tually privately owned., 72 The dispositive issue in Reber for the court was the
extent to which alternate sites were available for the expressive activities. The
Court ultimately found there were ample alternate fora available to the Plaintiff
and found that Knott's Berry Farm could prohibit the solicitors.
73
C. Constitutionality of Ordinances to Regulate Expressive Activity
The government frequently attempts to regulate traditionally protected First
Amendment activities in a public forum through the passage of a statute, ordi-
nance, or other regulation. The courts will then seek to determine whether the
interests of the state in regulating the activity outweigh the interests of the party
to engage in the expressive activity.74 The court applies strict scrutiny to de-
termine if the regulation serves a compelling government interest and the
means used to meet that interest is substantially related to that interest.75 This
is balanced against the interests of the individual and the person's right to en-
gage in the expressive activity.
76
In Cox v. State of Louisiana,77 the Court held a state statute constitutional
that prohibited picketing "with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or
impeding the administration of justice.., in or near a building housing a court
of the State of Louisiana. 78 The Court found that the "State has a legitimate
interest in protecting its judicial system from the pressures which picketing
near a courthouse might create." 79 The Court found that the statute was not ap-
plicable to peaceful picketers who were a distance from the courthouse and
who had been given official permission to conduct a demonstration.80
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,81 the Court found constitutional an anti-
noise ordinance that prohibited any sort of demonstration in any area adjacent
to a school that could disrupt the school while it was in session.82 Another or-
dinance in that same case, which prohibited picketing at a school, except in-
volving labor unions, was found to be unconstitutional as violative of equal
71 Id. at 1390.
72d. at 1389.
73 Id. at 1390.
71 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47, at 1232
(6"' ed. 2000).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
78 Id. at 560.
79 Id. at 562.80 Id. at 574.
8' 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
82 Id.
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protection. 83 The Court found that "[t]he crucial question is whether the man-
ner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a
particular place at a particular time." 84 The Court determined that "access to
the 'streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places . . . for the
purpose of exercising [First Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be de-
nied broadly'.85
During the same term, the Court found unconstitutional a similar ordinance
prohibiting all but labor picketing near schools in Police Department of Chi-
cago v. Mosley.8 6 The Court found the exclusion of some expressive activity
could not be upheld because "[s]elective exclusions from a public forum may
not be based on content alone..." 87 The Court used the same reasoning sev-
eral years later in Carey v. Brown.88 In that case, a statute prohibiting all but
labor picketing in residential areas was held to be invalid.89
In Frisby v. Schultz, 90 the Court upheld an ordinance banning all picketing
in residential areas when targeted at one particular residence, finding it nar-
rowly tailored to serve the state's interest, protecting individual citizens from
the harassment of picketers, rather than trying to ban all picketing.
9 1
Although the Supreme Court may allow some regulation of activity appli-
cable to private residences, as in Frisby, the Court is much less likely to uphold
similar exclusions to public buildings. In both Boos v. Barry and United
States v. Grace,93 the Court found Washington D.C. ordinances unconstitu-
tional that focused on preventing expressive activities at embassies and the Su-
preme Court building, respectively. In Grace, the sidewalks around the
perimeter of the Supreme Court were found to be "indistinguishable from other
public sidewalks in the city that are normally open to conduct that is at issue
here ... "94 In both cases, the Supreme Court found that the ordinances were
overbroad and "not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
95
In addition to Supreme Court decisions, there have been public forum cases
in the Ninth Circuit applicable to private property. In Monterey County De-
mocratic Central Committee v. United States Postal Service,96 the court foundthat the interior sidewalks of a post office could be construed as isolated and
" Id. at 107.
14id. at 116.
8 ld. at 117.
86 408 U.S. 92 (1972).871 Id. at 96.
" 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
89 Id.
90 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
9' Id. at 474-75.
92485 U.S. 312 (1988).
9'461 U.S. 171 (1983).
94 1d. at 182.95 Boos, 485 U.S. at 334.96 812 F.2d 1194 (9t ' Cir. 1987).
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not "a thoroughfare for passerby intent on other errands. This fact is sufficient
to overcome the presumption of public forum status otherwise accorded side-
walks."
97
Both One World One Family Now v. State of Nevada98 and S. 0. C., Inc. v.
County of Clark" found attempts to ban both commercial and expressive ac-
tivities along the Las Vegas Strip to be unconstitutional. In One World, the
Court found that placing tables along the Strip to "disseminate their message-
bearing t-shirts on public sidewalks" was reasonable and "entitled to First
Amendment protection."' 0 0 In S.O.C., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that an ordinance prohibiting all commercial canvassing was "overbroad
because it restricts not only purely commercial speech, but also fully protected
speech inextricably intertwined with commercial speech." 10 1
In general, the Constitution does not confer First Amendment rights to the
public for expressive activities or speech that occur on private property. 102 In
some instances, private property that serves in a very public capacity, may re-
ceive First Amendment protection for'speech and expressive activities.10 3 The
type of private property that may courts deem a public forum, rests primarily on
the way the owner allows the public to use it. In Marsh, 104 the Court reasoned
that, "the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statu-
tory and constitutional rights of those who use it."
10 5
III. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
A. Venetian Argument
The Venetian argued because it built the walkway on the private property
of the Venetian, it is exempt from First Amendment expressive activities.'
6
Therefore, the Venetian holds the exclusive right to regulate and control the ac-
tivities that take place on the walkway. 10 7 The Venetian claimed that it did not
bargain away its property rights in either the 1997 agreement with Clark
County or the 1999 agreement with the Nevada Department of Transportation.
Furthermore, the Venetian did not grant First Amendment protected activities
17 Id. at 1197.
9' 860 F. Supp. 1457 (D. Nev. 1994).
" 152 F.3d 1136 (9t' Cir. 1998).
o One World, 860 F. Supp. at 1462.
lo S.O.C., 152 F.3d at 1148.
102NOWAK, supra note 74, at 1226.
103 id.
10 326 U.S. 501.
5ld. at 506.
106 Plaintiffs Expedited Motion at 2, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
107 id.
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specifically to the public in either agreement.'
8
The Venetian argued that by not preventing the Union's activities on the
walkway by arresting or citing trespassers, the County's actions amounted to an
illegal taking of Plaintiff's property without due process to create a public fo-
rum.10 9 The Venetian sought a TRO and Preliminary Injunction(PI) to prevent
any member of the public from engaging in any expressive activity not ex-
pressly authorized by the Venetian. 110
B. Union Argument
The Unions had a three-pronged argument against the Venetian's motion
for TRO and PI: 1) the property rights to exclude the public claimed by the Ve-
netian are based on state law rather than federal law; 2) the agreements with the
County and NDOT established a public right-of-way whereby state law de-
prives property owners of the power to regulate dedicated land subject to a pub-
lic easement; and 3) the federal Constitution protects free speech activity on all
sidewalks on the Strip, which are considered to be public fora. 111
C. ACLUNArgument
The ACLUN argued that the property right claimed by the Venetian to pre-
vent expressive activity on the walkway does not exist.'1 12 The Venetian is "un-
able to cite any sources demonstrating that this alleged property right is recog-
nized in the State of Nevada."'
113
The ACLUN further argued that the Venetian's claim of irreparable harm
due to the alleged taking can be compensated through legal remedies, if in fact
any losses have occurred.1 4 The argument advanced by the ACLUN is that the
sidewalks in front of the Venetian are no different from any other sidewalk on
the Strip and should receive no different constitutional treatment." 5 If the Ve-
netian were allowed to prevail, the public's loss of First Amendment rights
would constitute irreparable harm, without any economic award available for
compensation.11 6 The district attorney took a neutral position,1 7 pending final
disposition by the court."
8
'°' Id. at 11.
109 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1031.
l 0 1d.
111 Union Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction at 1, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
112 Opposition to Plaintiffs at 5, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
13 Id.
14id.
"15 Id.
116 Id at 6.
117 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1032.
118 Id. at 1031 (the LVMPD on the advice of the District Attorney's office chose not to arrest
or otherwise cite any purported trespasser).
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D. Court's Ruling
The court first analyzed the standard required to grant prohibitory and
mandatory injunctive relief. 119 The Venetian sought a prohibitory injunction
preventing the County from issuing any further permits to the Unions "to hold
rallies on the sidewalk in front of the Venetian."' 20 In light of the County's re-
sponse that no further permits would be issued to the Unions, the court found
this issue to be moot.
121
On the second issue of mandatory injunctive relief, the Venetian claimed a
constitutional violation because a "taking" had occurred. 122 A "taking" occurs
123when private property is taken by the government without just compensation.
In determining whether a "taking" has occurred, the Supreme Court cites three
factors: "1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; 2) the extent
to which the regulation has [impacted] investment-backed interests; and 3) the
character of the government action."' 24 The court refused to address the Ve-
netian's claim of irreparable harm under a "takings" argument, because the Ve-
netian could not clearly demonstrate that it would succeed on the merits. 25
The court next examined the claim by the Unions that the Venetian failed
to state a federal claim and was attempting to "litigate a state-law trespass
claim" in a federal forum. 126 The Union relied on Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins 27 to claim that the Venetian Casino had not suffered damage under
the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by the state failing to enforce its
alleged private property rights.' 28 In Pruneyard, the California Supreme Court
ruled that, although protesters had no federal constitutional right to free speechin a private shopping center, they could stage a protest on the private property
because the California Constitution "conferred greater free speech rights on the
public than the federal minimum."'' 2 9 The Union argued in this case "that when
a state refuses to allow a commercial business to suppress free speech activity
on its private property, the state does not violate the owner's federal rights un-
der the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments."' 130 (emphasis original). TheUnions used Pruneyard to argue that the Venetian had suffered no deprivation
of property actionable under the Takings Clause because the action was based
9 1d. at 1031.
1'°Id. at 1032.12 01da
122 Id.
123 U. S. CONST. amend. V.
124 Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
125 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1032.
126 Union Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 9, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
127 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
128 Union Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 9, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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on local government action and not federal. 3 '
The district court in Venetian found that the Unions interpreted Pruneyard
Shopping Center too broadly in trying to show that a "state's interference with
private property rights could never amount to a constitutional taking."' 132 In
Pruneyard, the Supreme Court found the California Constitution gave broader
First Amendment rights than the federal Constitution and, thus, allowed free
speech in a private shopping center.' 33 The Court found that the California law
was not a constitutional taking because the free speech did not impair the value
of the shopping center.1 34 Using this argument, the Venetian Court rejected the
claim by the Unions that the Venetian did not state a federal claim under the
Takings Clause.'
35
The Unions argued that the Venetian gave up its property rights to the
sidewalks in the 1997 Agreement with Clark County, which was still control-
ling over the subsequent 1999 Agreement with the NDOT. 36 The court found
that the 1999 Agreement "providing that the sidewalk is the private property of
the Venetian controls."' 137 The Unions then contended that even if the side-
walks were found to be on private property, the public has access to the side-
walks for expressive activities protected under the First Amendment. 38 The
court found this to be a dispositive issue.
In finding the sidewalk in front of the Venetian to be a public forum, the
court looked at the nature of the sidewalk, finding it "is not simply a sidewalk
used for ingress or egress to the Venetian, nor is it a specific destination in and
of itself.... It is used to facilitate pedestrian traffic in daily commercial life
along the Las Vegas Strip generally, as well as for access to the Venetian." 39
The Venetian argued that Marsh140 should be the controlling law. In
Marsh, a privately owned town performed all the functions of a municipality,
and the Supreme Court found a First Amendment exception to privately held
land should be honored. 141 The Venetian claimed Marsh was limited to its
facts, 142 and because the Venetian does not perform all the functions of a mu-
nicipality, the Marsh exception should not apply to it.' 43 The court found that
the "subsequent Supreme Court cases have suggested that Marsh is not limited
1'1/d at 12-13.
132 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1032.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1032-33.
136 Id. at 1033.
137 Id. at 1034.
138 Union Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 16; Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
139 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1034-35.
140 326 U.S. 501.
141 Id.
142 Plaintiffs Expedited Motion at 12, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
143 id.
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to its facts.', 144
Although the court found "[p]rivate property rights are very important and
should not be disregarded simply because a private owner performs a function
that is sometimes performed by the government," 145 the court, nonetheless,
found that "if there ever was a case where the protections of the First Amend-
ment.., should be applied to private property used for a particular public func-
tion, this is the case."' 4 6 The court dismissed the cases cited by the Venetian as
having significant differences from the present case, and found the disputed
sidewalk "falls within a very limited exception to the general rule that private
property is not subject to the First Amendment .... The public may use the
Venetian's sidewalk for First Amendment purposes to the same degree that it
may use any other public sidewalk subject to content neutral and reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions."'
147
IV. ANALYSIS
Venetian certified the following question to the court: "Is Venetian's pri-
vate walkway, although private property, nevertheless a forum for expressive
activity under the First Amendment because the private walkway is connected
to adjoining public sidewalks and functions as a pedestrian thoroughfare?', 148
In arguing its case, the Venetian strongly contended that Marsh v. Alabama,
149
where a company owned and operated a town, and as such, was subject to First
Amendment protection, is confined strictly to its facts and is not applicable to
this case. 150 The Venetian relied on Marsh to argue that the sidewalks in ques-
tion cannot be construed as the equivalent of a municipality, but rather only a
small subpart.' 5 1 The court in this case found that cases like Marsh are very
rare, and subsequent Supreme Court cases have suggested Marsh is not limited
to its facts. 15 2 Therefore, that case is not controlling in the present case.
The Venetian Casino further argued that Lloyd v. Tanner153 should apply.
In that case the Court found a shopping center was not the equivalent of the
company town in Marsh and, therefore, the First Amendment did not apply.
154
The Court ruled that the shopping center could prohibit the distribution of
handbills on sidewalks in close proximity to the center, finding that "property
does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited
144Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1035.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1035.
14" id. at 1036.
148 Plaintiffs Expedited Motion at 3, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
149 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
150 Plaintiffs Expedited Motion at 12, Venetian (No. CV-S-99-00276-PMP).
151 Id.
152 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1035.
153 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
154 Id. at 569-70.
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to use it for designated purposes."' 55 There were two important distinctions in
that case. First, the sidewalks in question in Lloyd were in the interior of the
shopping center, compared with the Venetian Casino's exterior sidewalks.
Second, the shopping center had a strictly enforced policy against distribution
of handbills, as compared with the absence of any policy at the Venetian Ca-
sino.
The cases examined in this note provide ample and clear support for the
ruling in the Venetian case, finding the sidewalks in question a public forum for
First Amendment activities, despite being built on private property. The Su-
preme Court has strongly confirmed the doctrine of the public forum as it ap-
plies to First Amendment activities, and specifically applied it to streets and
parks in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization.56 Furthermore, the
Court elaborated on the doctrine with regards to various types of public fora, in
Perry Educators Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, finding
differing levels of regulation allowable, depending on the type of property and
its intended use. 15 7 In that case, the Court found sidewalks are a forum long
devoted to "assembly and debate"1 58 and are subject to a very limited right to
regulate expressive activity. 1
59
Through subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court or federal appellate
courts have applied the public forum doctrine to a variety of situations. These
include controlling expressive activities in shopping centers,' at the entrance
of amusement parks, 161 and union activities on private property. 62 In each of
these cases, the Court sought to balance private property rights with First
Amendment rights. In Logan Valley Plaza,163 the Court refused to enjoin a un-
ion from picketing a shopping center. The Court found the picketing was
within the reasonable use for which the property was intended. 64 In Reber, a
California district court limited the distribution of handbills on a small section
of a main thoroughfare to an amusement park, finding that there were alternate
available public sites very near to the private property. 165 A strong distinction
between that case and the Venetian case can be easily distinguished. Pedestri-
ans on the Strip, unlike the plaintiffs in Reber, have no alternate means to move
from one side of the Venetian property to the other except for the sidewalk in
155 Id. at 569.
156 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
157 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
I58 d. at 45.
159 Id.
160 See Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507
(1976).
161 See ISKCON v. Reber, 454 F. Supp. 1385 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
162 See Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
163 391 U.S. at 308.
'64 Id. at 325.
165Reber, 454 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
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question.
The Defendants in Venetian used another district court case, Citizens to
End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace,
Inc.166 to support their case. In Faneuil, protestors were questioning the right
of a marketplace to restrict their expressive activities on land owned by the
state and leased to the shopping center, with appropriate easements preserved
for the public.' 67 The important issue discussed in that case which is similar to
the Venetian Casino case, was the extent to which a private party can be re-
quired to uphold First Amendment expressive activity given the public nature
of the property in question.168 The court found that the pedestrian walkways at
Faneuil Hall Marketplace were similar to public streets, subject to a public
function. 169 Therefore, because the "defendant performs a 'public function'
and is involved in a 'symbiotic relationship' with the City - it is fair to attribute
defendant's action to the state and, accordingly, to examine defendant's con-
duct with constitutional scrutiny." 170 Another case used by the Unions and the
ACLU of Nevada in Venetian to support their argument regarding the public
nature of the sidewalks in question was Frisby v. Schultz.' 7' The Court con-
firmed the principle that sidewalks are "the archtype of a traditional public fo-
rum.' ' 172 Both these cases serve to support the public function that sidewalks
fronting the Venetian Casino serve.
In the Unions' arguments, they claimed the Venetian had failed to state a
federal claim and should file in state court. 17 3 In fact, there is evidence that
some individuals seeking to limit activities on private property will seek redress
in state courts using state trespass laws or other local government regulations.
These cases, decided in various jurisdictions, cover a wide variety of expressive
activity, including general protests, 174 abortion rights demonstrations, 75 peti-
166 745 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
1671 d. at 69, n.3.
168 Id. at 76.
169 id.
170 Id. at 74.
171 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
172 Id. at 480.
173 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d at 1032.
174 See, e.g., State v. Wicklund, 576 N.W. 2d. 753 (Minn. 1998) (free speech protection un-
der state constitution did not apply to Defendants' protesting at privately-owned shopping
mall); Tumey v. State, 922 P. 2d. 283 (Alaska 1996) (defendant's disorderly conduct convic-
tion was upheld if speech was unreasonably loud).
175 See, e.g., Operation Rescue-National v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Southeast
Texas, Inc., 975 S.W. 2d. 546 (Tex. 1998) (buffer zones on clinic property were held to be
justified if protesters interfered with access); Naumann v. Zimmer, 1998 WL 40570 (Minn.
App. 1998) (defendant was barred from church property and surrounding sidewalks due to
continual harassment of parishioners); Planned Parenthood of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Bell,
677 N.E. 2d. 204 (Mass. 1997) (protester's activities were outside of realm of constitution-
ally protected speech); Planned Parenthood of San Mateo County v. Operation Rescue of
California, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 736 (Cal. 1997) (injunction banning protestors coming within
15 feet of clinic did not burden speech more than was necessary to permit access); Planned
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tioning on private property, 176 restriction of certain targeted activities, 177 and
restricting labor union activities.' 8 Although courts typically limited the ex-
pressive activities under challenge, they did so invoking the established doc-
trine of speech restrictions based on reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions. 179
A court deciding another recent case in Las Vegas, Mirage Casino-Hotel v.
S.O.C., Inc.,' 80 reached a very different conclusion. That case is important to
the Venetian Casino case because the area in controversy is a sidewalk fronting
the Mirage Casino that serves the same purpose as the sidewalk fronting the
Venetian Casino. In Mirage, not only did the judge issue an injunction barring
the distribution of flyers on a public sidewalk adjacent to the large casino, but
also ruled that the sidewalks in front of the Mirage Casino-Hotel are private
property and did not rest in any public right-of-way.1 8' The judge also ruled
that the "exclusion of these defendants does not violate defendants' . . . alleged
rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or under the
Nevada Constitution."' 82 An important difference in the Mirage case was the
activity under challenge was commercial speech,183 differing from the union
protest at the Venetian Casino,' 84 though both cases challenged public activity
Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams, 898 P. 2d. 402 (Cal. 1995) (injunction barring
protesters from clinic sidewalk did not unduly burden protesters' First Amendment rights).
176 See, e.g., Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 1999 WL 1188842 (Wash.
1999) (defendant had no legally protected right to enter Plaintiffs property to gather signa-
tures); Trader Joe's Company v. Progressive Campaigns, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 442 (Cal. 1999)
(defendants lacked a state constitutional right to solicit signatures on the store's premises);
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc. 958 P. 2d. 854 (Or. 1998) (plaintiff could gather signatures in
private shopping center under state constitution).
177 See, e.g., McFarlin v. D.C., 681 A.2d. 440 (D.C. App. 1996) (panhandling Act was rea-
sonable regulation of begging and did not violate First Amendment); City of Cleveland v.
Bregar, 667 N.E.2d. 42 (Ohio App. 1995) (property of sports complex was ruled private
property for purposes of First Amendment free speech protection and Defendant could be
convicted of trespass); Lewis v. Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 941 P.2d. 266 (Colo.
1997) (plaintiff could use sidewalks near sports park for commercial activity).
178 See, e.g., Union of Needletrades, etc. Employees v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. App.4th 996
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (private shopping center could enforce reasonable rules related to pick-
eting); Bellemead Development Corp. v. Schneider, 472 A.2d. 170 (N.J. Super. 1983) (union
was enjoined from distribution of leaflets on private sidewalk in front of office building be-
cause of the private nature of the building); Garrison v. City of Lakeland, 954 F. Supp. 246
(M.D. Fla. 1997) (unions were enjoined from leafletting on private road to hospital).
179 See, NOWAK, supra note 74, at 1226.
180 Preliminary Injunction (No. A40198) (D.C. Nev. Dept. No. XVII, July 8, 1999) (order
granting preliminary injunction). (a preliminary injunction was issued enjoining commercial
entity from distributing printed material or soliciting business on the sidewalks that run di-
rectly in front of the Mirage and Treasure Island resorts).
l Id.
182 Id. at 3.
183 See, Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (the First
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects commer-
cial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation.").
184 Venetian, 45 F. Supp.2d 1027.
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on similarly situated public access sidewalks built directly adjacent to major
casino-hotels. The Mirage case was appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
185
Another Nevada case supporting the Venetian decision is S. 0. C. v. County
of Clark. 186 In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a Clark County Ordinance
prohibiting off-premises canvassing on sidewalks and areas in and around the
Las Vegas Strip, was overbroad and did not meet the least restrictive means test
to further a compelling government interest.' 87 Speech can be regulated under
the time, place, and manner standard if restrictions "(1) [are] content-neutral;
(2) [are] narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3)
leave ample alternative channels of communication."' 88 Although the county
maintained the ordinance was required to improve pedestrian traffic, maintain
accessible sidewalks, prevent harassment of pedestrians, and reduce litter, the
court found the county did not meet its burden of least restrictive means. 189
When sidewalks are used by the public in a general way,' 90 and not as in-
gress or egress from a particular establishment, 19 1 or exclusively as part of the
establishment,192 the designation of public forum for First Amendment pur-
poses is uniformly upheld. The Venetian Casino sidewalks are open to the pub-
lic, and do not function exclusively for the resort. Therefore, it is appropriate
to characterize these sidewalks as a public forum. When ruling on the applica-
tion of the public forum doctrine to specific cases, the court should carefully
examine the nature of the questioned property, the state's interest, the type of
regulation and the impact on the affected party, including the availability of
ample means of alternate channels of expression.
185 2001 WL 526671 (Nev. May 17, 2001). The Nevada Supreme Court upheld Judge
Cherry's preliminary injunction. Justice Young, writing for the majority, found that the Mi-
rage Casino had granted an easement for the public to use its private property sidewalk and
"the existence of the easement alone, without more, does not transform private property into
a public forum for constitutional scrutiny." Id. at 3. The concurring opinion found that the
public nature of the sidewalks did indicate they were, citing the Venetian decision, a "public
forum." However, Justices Maupin and Shearing found the nature of the commercial speech
"appear to solicit offers of illegal prostitution", and as such was "unprotected by the First
Amendment." Id. at 7. Justice Rose, in a dissent, agreed with the concurring opinion, but
felt the case should be remanded to the district court "for a determination of whether the ad-
vertisements in fact promote illegal activity and therefore are not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection." Id. at 9.
186 152 F.3d. 1136 (1998).
187 See, Andi Chang, The Ninth Circuit's Exotic Dance with the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 1 NEV. L.J. 226.
188 152 F.3d at 1145 (quoting One World One Family Now v. City and County of Honolulu,
76 F.3d. 1009, 1012 (9t' Cir. 1996)).
89 Id. at 1140.
190 See, One World, 860 F. Supp. at 1457.
191 See Monterey County Democratic Central Committee v. United States Postal Service, 812
F.2d 1194 (9" Cir. 1987); see also Reber, 454 F.Supp. at 1385.
192Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 507.
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V. CONCLUSION
Case law supports the Venetian decision finding the sidewalk in question is
a public forum for First Amendment purposes. Every case that allowed the
regulation of expressive activities presented significant differences from the
Venetian case. These differences included a more private nature of the prop-
erty, a more restricted use of it, or a more protected physical location of the
disputed areas. In each case, with the exception of Mirage, the area in question
was not as public or easily accessible as this sidewalk, which is the only means
of access for any pedestrian or group seeking to pass the resort, enter the resort,
or to disseminate a message to the public on the sidewalk in front of the resort.
In the Mirage case, the activity occurring on a similarly situated sidewalk was
struck down because it was suggested the activity may be promoting illegal
prostitution, and as such was not protected by the First Amendment. That
aside, Judge Pro's ruling, finding union activity and speech occurring on the
sidewalk was protected under the First Amendment because of it's public na-
ture and established use, should be affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, based on it's
opinion in S.O.C.
193
Casino owners and government officials in Las Vegas continually seek to
curtail the use of the public sidewalks for activity that is deemed as controver-
sial, such as handbilling or picketing. In light of the ruling in the Venetian,
194
as well as the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of the county's overbroad handbill-
ing ordinance in S.O.C. v. County of Clark, it is clear that the federal courts are
actively protecting the highly coveted First Amendment rights of free speech
on sidewalks categorized as public fora.
193 152 F.3d. at 1136.
194 45 F. Supp.2d at 1027.
